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“So Goes the Negro”:
Race and Labor in Miami, 1940-1963
by E RIC T S C H E S C H L O K

I

recent years, numerous studies have probed connections
between race relations and organized labor in twentieth-century America. Often, these studies have challenged the notion that
the modern civil rights movement began in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 school desegregation ruling. In their study of
race and labor, for example, Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein have argued that the civil rights era began in the 1940s with
the mobilization of large numbers of urban, working-class black
Americans. During this period, as the two authors have pointed
out, the “half million black workers who joined unions affiliated
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)” formed the
“vanguard of efforts to transform race relations” in America. Specifically, in examining race-related labor issues in Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, and Detroit, Michigan, Korstad and Lichtenstein
have illustrated— for those communities— the “centrality of mass
unionization in the civil rights struggle.“1
In Miami, Florida, race and labor intersected in many of
the ways outlined by Korstad and Lichtenstein. The city’s AfricanAmerican community entered a period of concerted civil rights acN

Eric Tscheschlok is a doctoral candidate at Auburn University. He would like to
thank Professors J. Wayne Flynt and Larry G. Gerber for their criticism and support of this project.
1. Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Found and Lost:
Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement,” Journal of American History 75 (December 1988), 786-811, quotations on 787. For additional studies
emphasizing the pre-1954 origins of the civil rights era, see Aldon D. Morris,
The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change
(New York, 1984); Jack M. Bloom, Class, Race, and the Civil Rights Movement
(Bloomington, 1987): Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of
Civil Rights as a National Issue (New York, 1978); Donald R. McCoy and Richard
T. Reutten, Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration
(Lawrence, Kans., 1973); Richard M. Dalfiume, “The ‘Forgotten Years’of the
Negro Revolution,” Journal of American History 55 (June 1968), 90-106; Peter J.
Kellogg, “Civil Rights Consciousness in the 1940s,” Historian 42 (November
1979), 18-41.
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tivism during the 1940s and advocates of biracial unionism figured
prominently in this early drive for social advancement. But unlike
Winston-Salem and Detroit, Miami never experienced a bona fide
labor-based civil rights movement because the drive for interracial
unionism never made great headway in South Florida. For blacks
in Miami and the rest of metropolitan Dade County, the “mass
unionization” to which Korstad and Lichtenstein alluded proved illusory until the 1960s.2
The failure of most of Miami’s interracial labor efforts in the
1940s and 1950s was not for lack of trying on the part of the city’s
black working class. Like African Americans in numerous other
communities, black Miamians aggressively endeavored to organize
themselves into unions during these years. Nevertheless, several
factors combined to frustrate the unionist ambitions of black working people in Miami well into the 1960s.
Foremost among these were the peculiar social and demographic, characteristics of the economy and labor market in Miami
and in Florida generally. These characteristics made unionization,
for whites as well as blacks, a difficult undertaking at best. To begin
with, Florida had the highest degree of ethnic diversity of any
southern state. Florida’s Jewish population, for instance, far and
away outstripped those of the other southern states. Cities like
Tampa and Miami also contained sizeable Hispanic communities.
Similarly, Florida’s black population expanded at an inordinately
swift rate during the first half of the twentieth century. Between
1920 and 1950, the number of blacks increased from 330,000 to
600,000, with the latter figure accounting for 22 percent of the total state population. Most of this increase resulted from the in-migration of blacks from other parts of the South, especially from
neighboring states like Georgia, whose black out-migrants consistently made Florida their destination of choice for the first six decades of the twentieth century.3

2. For a general overview of the civil rights movement in Miami, see Eric
Tscheschlok, “Long Road to Rebellion: Miami’s Liberty City Riot of 1968” (master’s thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 1995), 136-98.
3. Raymond A. Mohl, “The Settlement of Blacks in South Florida,” in Thomas D.
Boswell, ed., South Florida: The Winds of Change (Miami, 1991), 112-22; William E.
Vickery, The Economics of the Negro Migration, 1900-1960 (New York, 1977), 17778; Jerrell H. Shofner, “Florida and the Black Migration,” Florida Historical Quarterly 57 (January 1979), 267-88.
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Southern blacks were not alone in migrating to Florida. After
1920, a steady influx of newcomers from around the country and
globe enabled Florida’s rate of population growth to exceed that of
any other state below the Mason-Dixon line. From labor’s perspective, this constant demographic flux, together with the state’s deepseated racial and ethnic divisions; made Florida a challenging environment for organizing. These factors tended to create a segmented and unsettled labor force that held few prospects for mass
mobilization and demonstrated fewer signs of solidarity. V. O. Key,
Jr., confirmed this situation as late as 1949, noting tersely: “It can4
not be said . . . that [Florida] workers pull together effectively.“
The structure of Florida’s economy, too, acted as a deterrent to
organized labor. Florida contained few industries typical of the industrial-era South. Textile mills, mining operations, and heavy
manufacturing, which proved at least somewhat conducive to
unionization, did not exist in the Sunshine State to any significant
extent. Far more prevalent in Florida were smaller, specialized enterprises, such as Tampa’s cigar-rolling industry. Composed of
skilled cigar-makers, mostly of Latin descent, this industry functioned under conditions not usually considered favorable to industrial unionism. Even Florida’s only substantial manufacturing
enterprises— the shipbuilding operations in Jacksonville, Tampa,
and Pensacola— did not appeal to organized labor as strongly as
did similar heavy industries elsewhere in the South. The transient
nature of the state’s labor force made organizing these industries
unusually difficult, as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)
discovered when it sought to organize Florida shipyard workers
during World War I.5
Economically, ethnically, and demographically, therefore, Florida was a southern anomaly. Miami, likewise, was an equally aberrant part of the urban South. Its most distinctive trait was its unique
station as a thoroughly twentieth-century New South city. Though
incorporated in 1896, Miami did not emerge as a bustling urban
4. V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 1949), 85-86, 100.
5. Durward Long, “Labor Relations in the Tampa Cigar Industry, 1885-1911,”
Labor History 8 (Fall 1971), 551-59; Durward Long, “The Making of Modern
Tampa,” Florida Historical Quarterly 49 (April 1971), 333-45; Gary R. Mormino
and George E. Pozzetta, The Immigrant World of Ybor City: Italians and Their Latin
Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985 (Urbana, 1987), 97-141; Wayne Flynt, “Florida
Labor and Political ‘Radicalism,’1919-1920,” Labor History 9 (Winter 1968), 7390.
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center until the 1920s when the city entered a period of phenomenal growth. By 1930 the metropolitan area embraced 142,000 people. By mid-century Greater Miami claimed just under half a
million inhabitants. And only ten years later, the city stood poised
to overtake the one-million mark.6
In addition, Miami eclipsed most southern cities in its degree of
ethnic pluralism. Though only about 20,000 Hispanics, mostly Puerto Ricans, lived in Miami in 1950, the number of Spanish-speaking
residents surpassed 100,000 before the close of the decade. And, of
course, the city’s Latin population mushroomed tremendously amid
the Cuban exile migration of the 1960s. Similarly, Miami was home
to large numbers of immigrants from the Bahamas and other Caribbean islands. Furthermore, Miami’s Jewish community qualified as
the largest in the South. Between 1940 and 1950, the city’s Jewish
population rose from 8,000 to 55,000, reaching 100,000 by 1955.
The city’s African-American community, meanwhile, grew less rapidly than the Jewish or Hispanic populations. Still, the number of
blacks in the Miami metropolitan area almost tripled between 1940
and 1960, totalingjust under 140,000 by the latter year.7
Clearly, the ethnic and demographic patterns that worked to
the disadvantage of organized labor on a statewide level emerged
in Miami as well, but with greater intensity. This held true for the
city’s economic structure, too. In no way did Miami conform to the
industrial patterns characteristic of the rest of the urban South. Miami lacked the steel mills and iron foundries present in Birmingham and Chattanooga. The city contained no tobacco factories as
in Winston-Salem, nor any coal fields as in Kentucky and West Virginia. The textile and paper mills that dotted the landscape of
Georgia and the Carolinas had no equivalents in Dade County. In
sum, Miami boasted little manufacturing of any sort. Instead, the
6. Raymond A. Mohl, “Miami: New Immigrant City,” in Raymond A. Mohl, ed.,
Seaching for the Sunbelt: Historical Perspectives on a Region (Knoxville, 1990), 150.
7. Raymond A. Mohl, “Ethnic Politics in Miami, 1960-1986.” in Randall M. Miller
and George E. Pozzetta, eds., Shades of the Sunbelt: Essays on Ethnicity, Race, and the
Urban South (Westport, Conn., 1988), 144-45; Deborah Dash Moore, “Jewish
Migration to the Sunbelt,” in ibid., 46; Dade County Council on Community
Relations, “Progress Report,” pamphlet (1959?), Records of the Governor's
Advisory Commission on Race Relations, Record Group 100, Series 226, box 8,
Florida State Archives, Tallahassee (hereinafter GACRR Records); Raymond A.
Mohl, “Black Immigrants: Bahamians in Early Twentieth-Century Miami,” Florida Historical Quarterly 65 (January 1987), 271-97; Mohl, “Settlement of Blacks,”
112-22.
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city domiciled scores of small retail firms and tourist-related service
industries.
In significant ways, then, Miami differed from the South’s leading industrial centers. Owing to these differences, the city’s labor
institutions developed during the 1940s along lines unlike those of
many other urban communities, including those studied by
Korstad and Lichtenstein. Miami’s labor movement, while spectacular in some respects, nonetheless lacked the dynamism of labor
activities in both Winston-Salem and Detroit. Consequently, the degree of black participation in Miami’s labor movement, as well as
the effectiveness of labor-oriented black militancy, paled somewhat
in comparison with those two communities, and with many others.
A primary reason for this was that the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) monopolized union operations in Dade County and
throughout Florida. The more radical CIO, which worked best in
the manufacturing industries so scarce in Florida, never gained a
secure foothold in Miami. By the end of the 1930s, in fact, only
1,100 workers in the entire state belonged to CIO organizations as
compared with an AFL union membership of 40,000. During the
1940s, CIO campaigns to establish biracial unions in Miami scored
a few successes, but these proved fleeting. By 1950, the left-leaning,
racially progressive group had faded virtually out of sight in Miami
and in many other areas of the conservative cold war-era South.8
By contrast, AFL organizations proliferated in Miami during
the 1940s and 1950s. The spread of AFL unionism generally
opened few doors for Miami’s black workers, however, since the
AFL permitted its local units wide latitude in regulating their affairs. In race-conscious southern cities like Miami, this policy all
but ensured exclusionary and unequal treatment of African Americans by labor organizations. As Wayne Flynt states, “the AFL by
guaranteeing its unions local autonomy acquiesced to racial discrimination.“9 In short, AFL predominance in Dade County meant
8. Gilbert J. Gall. “Southern Industrial Workers and Anti-Union Sentiment: Arkansas and Florida in 1944,” in Robert H. Zieger, ed., Organized Labor in the Twentieth-Century South (Knoxville, 1991), 232. For the CIO and the South, see Barbara
S. Griffith, The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the CIO
(Philadelphia, 1988); Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of
the American Labor Movement, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Robert H.
Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill, 1995); Sumner Rosen, “The CIO Era,
1935-1955,” in Julius Jacobson, ed., The Negro in the American Labor Movement
(Garden City, N.Y., 1968), 188-208.
9. J. Wayne Flynt, “The New Deal and Southern Labor,” in James C. Cobb and
Michael V. Namorato, eds., The New Deal and the South (Jackson, 1984), 85.

Published by STARS, 1997

5

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 76 [1997], No. 1, Art. 5

RACE

AND

LABOR

IN

MIAMI, 1940-1963

47

that local unions clung stubbornly to the color line long after barriers of racial inequity began to fall in other social spheres.
Of course, Miami’s black community had known labor discrimination long before the 1940s. Since the city’s incorporation in 1896,
Miami mirrored the rest of the Jim Crow South in embracing a protocol of labor relations that limited craft and employment opportunities for African Americans. By the 1920s, municipal ordinances
prohibited African-American craftsmen from plying trades in white
areas of the city. Local authorities continued to enforce these strictures as late as the 1940s. Many blacks did work in white communities, but in domestic or manual-labor capacities only. As one field
agent for the Commission on Interracial Cooperation observed in
the 1930s, Miami blacks were not “allowed to come into [the] white
part of [the] business section unless in some servile capacity.“10
Black workers found little solace in organized labor, as trade
unions invariably excluded them. At the same time, though, the
scope of unionism in Dade County was negligible prior to 1940.
Unions existed in Miami, but the city was a far less fertile ground
for labor activities than other urban areas in Florida. In industrial
shipping centers like Jacksonville, Tampa, and Pensacola, labor
unions enjoyed some success in the first half of the century.11 But
until the 1940s Miami’s economy revolved principally around tourism and thus did not lend itself to the labor-intensive fields that experienced mass unionization in other metropolitan communities.
Changing economic patterns, triggered in part by the onset of
World War II, altered this situation in the 1940s as Miami became a
more industrialized and economically diverse metropolis. Around
1940, for instance, commercial aviation emerged as a major growth
industry in Miami, which soon served as the main hub for Eastern
and Delta Airlines and Pan American Airways. Military operations in
Miami resulted in improved and expanded aviation facilities, which
10. Paul S. George, “Colored Town: Miami’s Black Community, 1896-1930,” Florida
Historical Quarterly 56 (April 1975), 432-47; Lorenzo J. Greene and Carter G.
Woodson, The Negro Wage Earner (Washington, D.C., 1930), 323; Dade County
District Welfare Board No. 9, “Monthly Report on Defense Developments, MayJune 1942,” typescript, Part 1, Series 6, box 56, National Urban League Papers,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; L. R. Reynolds, “Florida Trip— Feb. 1-8,
1981.” typescript, reel 45, Papers of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, microfilm edition.
11. For organized labor activities in Florida cities before 1940, see Wayne Flynt,
“Pensacola Labor Problems and Political Radicalism, 1908,” Florida Historical
Quarterly 43 (April 1965), 315-32; Flynt, “Florida Labor and Political ‘Radicalism,’ 73-90.
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helped the city become a gateway for civil air travel after the war.
Wartime activities also spurred the growth of Miami’s once-minuscule manufacturing sector. In 1940, only 3,600 Miamians, or roughly
three percent of the local workforce, held factory jobs. A decade
later, nearly 15,000 operatives worked in manufacturing capacities,
which by then included new war-inspired industries like shipbuilding. Manufacturing expanded further during the 1950s so that by
1959 Miami’s industrial sector claimed almost 40,000 employees,
who accounted for about 13 percent of the total labor force.12
As Miami underwent the transformations incidental to industrial growth, a budding labor movement took shape. The same was
true for other cities as well. As David Brody has argued, the New
Deal labor relations legislation of the 1930s combined with wartime prosperity and soaring employment rates in the 1940s to create both a legal framework and a social setting conducive to
workplace-oriented militancy and mass unionization in industrial
regions throughout the country. Miami felt the impact of these developments in the early 1940s when the city’s emerging proletariat
began demanding a greater collective voice within Miami’s workplaces. The pervasiveness of local unionist sentiment became evident in 1943 and 1944, when Florida’s attorney general led a rightto-work crusade against closed-shop labor contracts. In a statewide
referendum in 1944, Dade County’s electorate voted in favor of
union security and against the open-shop proposition.13 Though
the right-to-work forces ultimately prevailed, the referendum signaled the strength of Miami’s wartime labor movement.
The wartime unionization of the city’s workforce remained
largely racially exclusive, however. The AFL dominated labor organization in these years, and with few exceptions AFL unions made
obeisance to the prescripts of Jim Crow. Nonetheless, black working people challenged the system of exclusion. The 1940s brought
a heightened awareness of civil rights and civil liberties issues to
black communities throughout America, and black Miamians
12. Raymond A. Mohl, “Changing Economic Patterns in the Miami Metropolitan
Area, 1940-1980,” Tequesta: The Journal of the Historical Association of Southern Florida 42 (1982), 63-73; Gall, “Southern Industrial Workers,” 227.
13. David Brody, “Labor and the Great Depression: The Interpretive Prospects,”
Labor History 13 (Spring 1972), 231-44. Other scholars have also emphasized the
war’s decisive impact upon organized labor, especially in the South. See Flynt,
“The New Deal and Southern Labor,” 68-72, and F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the
South (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Gall, “Southern Industrial Workers,” 228-36.
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aimed to let the labor establishment know it. Hence, African-American workers fought to gain union membership, struggling collectively for what Korstad and Lichtenstein have called “the industrial
‘citizenship’that union contracts offered once-marginal elements
of the working class.14 These efforts, often backed by the CIO, and
in one noteworthy instance by the AFL, produced some impressive
successes. By the same token, though, these successes generally
proved impermanent.
The first large-scale organization of black workers in Miami
took place in the early 1940s in the commercial laundry industry,
and it occurred under the auspices of the AFL. Spearheading this
drive was James Nimmo, a black Bahamian immigrant and member
of Florida’s Communist Party (CP) who boasted a long history of
civil militancy. During the 1920s Nimmo served prominently in the
Miami division of Marcus Garvey’s black nationalist organization,
the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) , which enjoyed widespread support within the city’s large Bahamian enclave.
Nimmo’s efforts to unionize black laundry and dry cleaning workers in the 1940s were highly effective. The new union did not, however, symbolize a titanic triumph over AFL racial bias. Like the
laundry industry as a whole, the union was almost totally black and,
hence, segregated de facto. Still, unionization certainly enhanced
economic and occupational opportunities for hundreds of AfricanAmerican workers. Moreover, the success of Nimmo’s efforts made
Miami one of only four Deep South cities in which the AFL Laundry Workers Union was able to set up shop by the mid-1940s.15
CIO representatives also had some brief success organizing
black workers in the Miami area. During the war years, Dade
14. Korstad and Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Found and Lost,” 787.
15. “Testimony of James Nimmo,” Dade County Grand Jury, Investigation into Communistic Activities in Miami, Florida, October 27-28, 1954, Papers of the Florida
Legislative Investigation Commission, Record Group 940, Series 1486, box 6,
Florida State Archives, Tallahassee (hereinafter FLIC Papers); “Testimony of
James Nimmo,” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American
Activities (HUAC), Investigation of Communist Activities in the State of Florida,
November 29-December 1, 1954 (Washington, D.C., 1955), 7426-48; “Testimony
of Edwin E. Waller,” in ibid., 7306-307; Raymond A. Mohl, “‘South of the
South’? Jews, Blacks, and the Civil Rights Movement in Miami, 1945-1960,”
forthcoming in Journal of American Ethnic History. For the UNIA in Miami, see
Robert A. Hill, ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association
Papers, 7 vols. (Berkeley, 1983-1990), Vol. 3, 513-15,656-57, Vol. 6, 594-95, Vol. 7,
124, 133-34, 141-42, 166-71; Herbert R. Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro
(New York, 1944), 134.
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County’s Local 59 of the CIO Shipbuilders Union flourished as an
interracial body. The union’s regional director took special note of
“the tremendous success of [the] organization among the Miami
Negro workers.” Biracial organizing continued in the late 1940s
under the direction of the CIO-affiliated Transport Workers Union
(TWU), a New York-based outfit seeking to expand nationally. In
this endeavor the TWU enlisted the aid of Florida CIO director
Charles Smolikoff, who once managed Local 59 of the Shipbuilders Union.16 According to a 1955 state investigation, Smolikoff was
also “the leading Communist in the Miami area” during the 1940s.
In hearings before the U.S. House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in 1954, several local CP members corroborated
this claim, with one commenting that Smolikoff proudly styled
himself “to the left of left.“17
About the time World War II ended, the TWU hired Smolikoff
and a handful of local labor activists, including James Nimmo, to
organize workers in Miami’s aviation industry. By 1946 this team
succeeded in forming a racially integrated union— TWU Local
500— from employees at Pan American Airways and Eastern Airlines.18 Black air transport workers proved avid backers of the
union movement. Lou Popps, a black Pan Am cargo porter and
TWU shop steward, recalled that he and his colleagues joined the
union to combat unequal employment practices. The airline, for
instance, provided air-conditioned, terrazzo-floored dining areas
for its white personnel, while black workers ate in the lounge
16. William Smith to Thomas J. Gallagher, November 18, 1943, Series 5, box 102,
Archives of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, Historical Manuscripts and Archives Department, University of Maryland,
College Park (hereinafter IUMSWA Archives); “Testimony of Charles Smolikoff,” Dade County Grand Jury Investigation, Miami, Florida, June 25, 1954,
box 6, FLIC Papers; Joshua B. Freeman, In Transit: The Transport Workers Union
in New York City, 1933-1966 (New York, 1989), 261.
17. Ellis S. Rubin, Report on Investigation of Subversive Activities in Florida by the Special
Assistant Attorney General, State of Florida, in Cooperation with the American Legion,
Department of Florida (Tallahassee, 1955), 32; “Testimony of Louis James Popps,”
in HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in the State of Florida, 7398; “Testimony of Edwin E. Waller,” in ibid., 7296-97, 7313.
18. Charles Smolikoff to Douglas L. MacMahon, May 9, June 1, September 1, 1946;
Charles Smolikoff to Art Shields, (1946?), all in Local 500 file, Papers of the
Transport Workers Union of America, Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New
York University, New York City (hereinafter TWU Papers); Freeman, In Transit,
261; “Testimony of Charles Smolikoff;” “Testimony of James Nimmo,” box 6,
FLIC Papers; Rubin, Report on Investigation of Subversive Activities in Florida, 30-45;
Miami Herald, August 6, 1946.
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kitchen under “pretty poor conditions.” With a view toward eradicating shop-floor inequality, then, Popps and his African-American
co-workers became the union’s most vocal advocates.19
By 1948, however, CIO organizing drives began to encounter
serious resistance. Like interracial labor campaigns and radical
civil liberties causes nationwide, those in Miami suffered devastating setbacks amid the conservative political and racial atmosphere
of the early cold war years. Throughout the country, anticommunist partisans questioned the patriotism of almost any human
rights, labor, or left-liberal association that voiced dissatisfaction
with the status quo. This was especially true in the South, where
conservative segregationists cloaked themselves behind a thick veneer of “Americanism” while denouncing civil rights coalitions and
militant labor brotherhoods as subversive torchbearers of Stalinism. To southern votaries of McCarthyism, the line between social
activism and socialism was not fine, but invisible.20
Cold war politics in Florida conformed to this paradigm, as evidenced during the state’s 1950 U.S. Senate race. The contest pitted veteran New Dealer Claude Pepper against fellow Miamian
George A. Smathers. Pepper had been popular among Florida voters since the 1930s. By the late 1940s however, Pepper’s recent appeals for close U.S.-Soviet relations alienated him from the state’s
red-scared electorate.21 Smathers, meanwhile, exploited popular
anxieties to perfection. His political expressions, according to one
scholar, were “weighted with bigotry and with fanatically misleading patriotism,” not to mention considerable antipathy for union19. “Testimony of Louis James Popps,” in HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities
in the State of Florida, 7398-99.
20. For right-wing attacks on leftist and civil rights groups during the McCarthy Era,
see Fred J. Cook, The Nightmare Decade (New York, 1971); Richard M. Fried,
Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York, 1990); Wilson
Record, Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict (Ithaca, 1964); Harvey A. Levenstein, Communism, Anticommunism, and the CIO
(Westport, Conn., 1981); Gerald Horne, Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956 (Cranbury, N.J., 1988). For the South specifically, see Numan V.
Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s
(Baton Rouge, 1969), 170-89; American Jewish Congress, Assault upon Freedom of
Association: The Southern Attack on the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (New York, 1957); Irwin Klibaner, “The Travail of Southern Radicals: The Southern Conference Education Fund,” Journal of Southern History 49
(February 1983), 179-202; Thomas A. Krueger, And Promises to Keep: The Southern
Conference for Human Welfare (Nashville, 1967).
21. James C. Clark, “Claude Pepper and the Seeds of His 1950 Defeat, 1944-1948,”
Florida Historical Quarterly 74 (Summer 1995), 1-22.
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ism. Thus, during the campaign Smathers cursed a CIO-sponsored
black voter-registration drive in Florida as a “dangerous invasion of
carpetbaggers.” He also blasted Pepper as a Russian sympathizer
who was soft on the race question. The election results revealed a
great deal about public sentiment in postwar Florida. Despite overwhelming pro-Pepper support from organized labor, Florida leftwingers, and the state’s large, liberal Jewish population, Smathers
won the Senate seat with ease. As one author has remarked, Florida’s white masses solidly backed Smathers’s “nigger- and red-baiting” campaign against Pepper.22
The conservative, anticommunist ethos pervaded Dade
County as well. Of course, many Americans envisioned Miami as a
liberal hotbed, a cosmopolitan playground for transplanted Yankees and foreign tourists. In 1958, the national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) expressed a nationwide
assumption when he billed Miami as “not so intolerant as most cities of the Deep South.“23 This assessment fell short of reality, however. Investigative journalist Stetson Kennedy probably came closer
to the mark in 1951 when he dubbed Miami an “anteroom to Fascism.” White civil rights activist Ruth Perry painted a similar picture
in 1957, observing that Miami had “an appearance of more liberality and freedom than actually exists.“24
The McCarthyite spirit was therefore more virulent in Miami
than most Americans would have imagined. During hearings in
1948, for example, Dade County solicitors displayed indifference
toward death threats made against suspected radicals, but grew
irate when witnesses did not supply information regarding Communist infiltration of the local garment industry. Moreover, biracial
CIO activities attracted considerable attention from white-supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Having served mainly to
intimidate suffrage-minded blacks and to enforce the residential
color line during the 1930s and early 1940s, the Miami Klan ex-

22. Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South: Stars of the New Confederacy (New
York, 1968), 136-73, quotations on 137 and 150; Morton Sosna, In Search of the
Silent South: Southern Liberals and the Race Issue (New York, 1977), 165.
23. James R. Robinson to Mrs. Phillip Stern, October 13, 1958, Series 5, reel 19,
Papers of the Congress of Racial Equality, microfilm edition (hereinafter CORE
Papers).
24. Stetson Kennedy, “Miami: Anteroom to Fascism,” The Nation 173 (December 22,
1951), 546-47; Ruth W. Perry, “Along Freedom’s Road,” Miami Times, June 15,
1957.
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panded its repertoire in postwar years to include harassing advocates of interracial unionism. Once in 1948, in fact, white-robed
Klansmen paid an intimidating visit to Charlie Smolikoff’s home.25
Miami police, meanwhile, hounded local radicals incessantly.
In 1943, the city’s police chief personally arrested Smolikoff for a
vehicle inspection infraction, admitting that the arrest came in response to white complaints about Smolikoff’s organizing of ship
building workers “in the negro section.” Such harassment
increased in postwar years, when police targeted CIO organizers as
fifth-column subversives. In 1948, Miami lawmen raided the homes
of a few local CP members, sometimes without warrants. At the
same time, the Miami Daily News directed a battery of vicious redbaiting exposes against Smolikoff and the TWU. Writing for the
Daily Worker, the official organ of the CP of America, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn impugned this “gutter journalism” as a “lynch campaign”
directed against the forces of progressive change.26 Yet, Flynn was
too generous in her assessment of the “progressive” TWU. At that
moment the union’s national leadership was veering noticeably to
the right of its original radical moorings. Like many labor groups at
this time, the TWU yielded to McCarthyite pressure and attempted
to demonstrate its national loyalty by purging its ranks of known
Communists. Hence, in 1948 the TWU fired Smolikoff and his
team of organizers.27 This action left Miami’s interracial union
25. Daily Worker, March 3, April 13, 1948; Freeman, In Transit, 294. For Klan
attempts to intimidate black voters, see Alonzo P. Holly to Walter White, June 8,
July 13, 1932, Part 4, Series C, reel 1, Papers of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, microfilm edition (hereinafter NAACP
Papers); “Miami Klan Tries to Scare Negro Vote,” Life (May 15, 1939), 27; Miami
Herald, May 3, 1939; Ralph J. Bunche, The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of
FDR, ed. Dewey W. Grantham (Chicago, 1973), 199-200, 307-309, 451-52. For
Klan efforts to maintain residential segregation, see Pittsburgh Courier, August
11, November 17, 1945, February 23, 1946, November 15, 1947. The Pittsburgh
Courier was a black-run newspaper whose Florida edition offered extensive coverage of events in Miami and enjoyed wide circulation within Dade County’s
black community. Sam B. Solomon to Millard F. Caldwell, November 3, 1945,
telegram; Wesley E. Garrison to Millard Caldwell, May 4, 1946, both in Millard
Fillmore Caldwell Papers, Record Group 102, Series 576, box 18, Florida State
Archives, Tallahassee (hereinafter Caldwell Papers).
26. Miami Herald news clipping, (March 1943?), Series 5, box 102, IUMSWA
Archives; Bella Fisher to Civil Rights Congress, July 26, 1948, Part 2, reel 24,
Papers of the Civil Rights Congress, microfilm edition (hereinafter CRC
Papers); Miami Daily News, February 17-19, 22, 24, March 6, 11, 1948; Daily
Worker, March 3, 1948.
27. Freeman, In Transit, 294-317; “Testimony of James Nimmo,” in HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in the State of Florida, 7443-44.
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movement without an institutional base. Consequently, the movement collapsed almost immediately.
More than anticommunism led to the failure of CIO initiatives
in Miami, however. For one thing, the structure of the local business economy hampered CIO attempts to effect industry-wide
unionization. As F. Ray Marshall has illustrated, the low-skill, smallfirm nature of Southern industry served as a stumbling block to organizing efforts throughout Dixie. The same was true in Miami,
where manufacturing in the 1940s and 1950s remained the province of small plants that produced simple wares with a low-wage labor force. Moreover, by 1950 only 9.4 percent of the metropolitan
workforce— less than 15,000 people— worked in industrial fields
that the CIO would have likely considered within its operational
purview. Though this level of industrial employment represented a
threefold increase over prewar levels, the city’s postwar industrial
workforce was still comparatively small. The CIO, therefore, whose
business strategy revolved around industrial unionism rather than
AFL-style trade unionism, tread upon shaky ground in Miami from
the start.28
Racial controversy within the CIO also blunted the group’s effectiveness. Despite the CIO’s egalitarian preachments, there was
in Miami some discrepancy between theory and practice in this regard. In 1943, a representative of the Shipbuilders Union flatly declared that the CIO’s national anti-discrimination plank should be
put aside when confronting touchy racial issues. Too vigorous a
push for black rights, this official believed, would cause white workers to boycott the union, thereby undermining its bargaining
power. Other unions took similar precautions. Most obviously, the
CIO union hall was reserved for whites only, Black union meetings
took place in “Colored Town.” McCarthyite assaults precipitated
further vacillation on racial-advancement issues. One Jewish radical repined in 1949 that CIO-baiting in Miami caused “a general
slackening of the fight for Negro rights within the progressive
T.W.U. union.” CIO tolerance of Jim Crow led to friction between
white and black labor activists. Lou Popps, for instance, rebuked lo-

28. Marshall, Labor in the South; Mohl, “Changing Economic Patterns,” 66.

Published by STARS, 1997

13

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 76 [1997], No. 1, Art. 5

RACE

AND

LABOR

IN

MIAMI, 1940-1963

55

cal TWU leadership for its “wishy-washy” stand against segregation
and inequality in the city’s airline industries.29
James Nimmo levied similar criticisms. Though himself a Communist, Nimmo believed white CIO organizers overzealously promoted the Communist agenda at the expense of union welfare, not
to mention black aspirations for workplace equality. Charlie Smolikoff, for example, repeatedly chided Nimmo for failing to recruit
black CP members from the AFL Laundry Workers Union. Nimmo,
however, refused to court disaster by preaching communism in an
AFL union. He also understood that black workers supported
unionism, not for abstract ideological reasons, but for the promise
of job security and better working conditions. From Nimmo’s perspective, Smolikoff seemed “all interested in building the Communist Party,” but less concerned about racial issues and general
business matters affecting local unions.30
Similarly, Nimmo detected patterns of racial stratification
within the CP itself. Though a member of the CP’s executive city
committee, Nimmo found himself excluded from many of the
committee’s closed-door meetings, summoned “only when . . .
needed” for “discussions on Negro problems.” When Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn came to town in 1948 to meet with local party chieftains, Nimmo knew nothing of the visit until the next day-when
he read about it in the Miami Daily News. Small wonder, then, that
Nimmo believed the city’s white leftists merely “played up” the
theme of racial justice in order to “gain the sympathy of the Negroes to draw them into the party.“31
The persistence of racial inequity in Miami’s Left-led labor
movement conformed to a pattern common in many southern cities. Recently, in studying labor activities in Birmingham’s iron and
steel industries, Robert J. Norrell has determined that the (CIO’s
egalitarian rhetoric was just that. Michael Honey has reached simi29. William Smith to Thomas J. Gallagher, November 18, 1943, Series 5, box 102,
IUMSWA Archives; Bobby Graff to William L. Patterson, August 17, 1949, Part
2, reel 24, CRC Papers; “Testimony of James Nimmo,” in HUAC, Investigation of
Communist Activities in the State of Florida, 7436; “Testimony of Louis James
Popps,” in ibid., 7398.
30. “Testimony of James Nimmo, ” in HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in
the State of Florida, 7437, 7440-41.
31. “Testimony of James Nimmo, ” in HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in
the State of Florida, 7442-45; Daily Worker, March 3, 5, 1948; Miami Daily News, February 17-19, 22, 24, March 6, 11, 1948.
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lar conclusions regarding CIO operations in Memphis. According
to him, “the South’s racial etiquette remained firmly in place in
most CIO unions” in Memphis, where “racial divisions remained a
potent source of [union] conflict, controversy, and weakness.” For
these scholars the CIO’s equivocation on the race question contributed largely to that group’s inability to organize Southern industrial workers on any grand scale. They certainly depict the CIO in a
far less progressive light than do Korstad and Lichtenstein in their
examination of the CIO in Winston-Salem.32
Critics of Honey and Norrell argue that the two historians underestimate the obstacles facing the CIO in the South. Aside from
right-wing repression and handicaps involving the structure of
southern industry, the CIO confronted a white culture overwhelmingly united in its defense of the existing racial order. According to
these critics, the pressure of this massive resistance, rather than any
hypocritical conservatism of the CIO, accounted for accommodationist Jim Crowism in southern CIO unions. As Judith Stein states
in her study of labor in Birmingham, “the wide gap between union
principles . . . and attitudes prevailing in the surrounding city, diluted practice.” Likewise, Rick Halpern has shown that in Fort
Worth’s packinghouse industry the CIO fought earnestly for black
shop-floor rights, while declining to challenge southern racial conventions outside the workplace as a simple matter of survival. These
studies suggest that Honey and Norrell misjudge the extent to
which the CIO could have realistically won civil rights for southern
blacks. Popular opposition to black social progress, not the policies
of unions themselves, explained the temporary condition of interracial unionism in Dixie.33
On a related note, some historians have pointed out that the
practice of racial separatism did not cost unions black support.
Bruce Nelson, for example, has found that black shipyard workers
32. Robert J. Norrell, “Caste in Steel: Jim Crow Careers in Birmingham, Alabama,”
Journal of American History 73 (December 1986), 669-94; Michael Honey, “Industrial Unionism and Racial Justice in Memphis, ” in Zieger, ed., Organized Labor in
the Twentieth-Century South, 135-57, quotations on 146 and 147; Michael Honey,
Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana, 1993).
33. Judith Stein, “Southern Workers in National Unions: Birmingham Steelworkers,
1936-1951,” in Zieger, ed., Organized Labor in the Twentieth-Century South, 183-222,
quotation on 195; Rick Halpern, “Interracial Unionism in the Southwest: Fort
Worth’s Packinghouse Workers, 1937-1954,” in ibid., 158-82. See also Alan
Draper, Conflict of Interests: Organized Labor and the Civil Rights Movement, 19541968 (Ithaca, 1994), 9-14.
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in New Orleans and Mobile continued to back the CIO Longshoremen’s Union despite its acquiescence to discrimination because
they saw unionism as a source of benefits previously unattainable.
Given this fact, Alan Draper has suggested that the CIO’s equivocation on race represented an “astute” course of self-preservation in
the race-conscious South. At any rate, Nelson and Draper, like
Halpern and Stein, have exonerated the CIO from culpability for
its failings in the South.34
The foregoing arguments shed some light on the CIO situation in Miami. As mentioned earlier, the structure of the economy
and the city’s unique ethnic mixture provided a less-than-ideal setting for industrial unionism. Clearly, attacks from the political
Right proved detrimental as well. Also, like CIO leaders elsewhere,
those in Miami feared that strong agitation for racial equality
would result in charges of “nigger unionism” by working-class
whites. Further, black Miamians, like African Americans in other
communities, supported the union movement despite its meek
stance on civil rights. Even James Nimmo admitted that most black
workers thought the CIO and CP were “doing a great job in assisting the Negroes.“35
Nevertheless, the racial policies of Miami’s CIO had a more
damaging impact than Draper and like-minded scholars acknowledge. As the objections raised by Nimmo and Lou Popps plainly illustrate, CIO ambivalence on racial matters caused disaffection
among Miami’s leading black labor organizers. This dissension
scarcely aided the cause of interracial unionism. Moreover, CIO accommodation to Jim Crow divested its organizing activities of the
committed moral vision needed to sustain a true social movement.
Thus, as Honey and Norrell conclude in their studies of Memphis
and Birmingham, CIO organizations in Miami indeed bore a share
of the responsibility for their own failings. That no union-anchored
civil rights movement emerged in Miami during the 1940s was, at
least in part, a consequence of labor’s own volition.
34. Bruce Nelson, “Class and Race in the Crescent City: The ILWU from San Francisco to New Orleans,” in Steven Rosswurm, ed., The CIO's Left-Led Unions (New
Brunswick, N.J., 1992), 19-45; Draper, Conflict of Interests, 12. See also Alan
Draper, “New Southern Labor History Revisited: The Success of the Mine, Mill,
and Smelters Union in Birmingham, 1934-1938,” Journal of Southern History 62
(February 1996), 87-108.
35. “Testimony of James Nimmo, ” in HUAC, Investigation of Communist Activities in
the State of Florida, 7441.
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The course followed by local CIO organizers after their dismissal from the TWU further illustrates this point. For a brief period, Smolikoff, Nimmo, and their circle of associates attempted to
continue their biracial organizing activities from within the ranks
of Miami’s newly founded chapter of the Civil Rights Congress
(CRC). This organization sprang into national existence in 1946
through the merger of three agencies that promoted racial equality, labor rights, and civil liberties: the National Negro Congress,
the International Labor Defense, and the National Federation for
Constitutional Liberties. Miami’s CRC branch came into being in
1948, when several local Jewish radicals organized the chapter in
response to conservative assaults upon Miami’s leftist community.36
A composite of militant blacks, labor rights advocates, and leftwing and predominantly female Jews, the local CRC employed a variety of interracial mass-action tactics to call public attention to the
ignominy of Jim Crow in Miami. The group’s CIO contingent
worked mainly in the area of black labor rights, challenging the exclusionary policies of AFL unions and seeking to form new biracial
labor organizations. Thus, by 1950, the CRC established a Greater
Miami Right to Work Committee to combat racially restrictive labor practices, especially in local construction industries, which employed a large segment of Miami’s African-American workforce.37
These efforts stalled at times, however, as the CRC experienced
the same racial cleavage that earlier rent CIO and CP leadership.
To the dismay of CRC coordinator Matilda “Bobby” Graff, most of
the group’s labor activists refused to link their “fight in the shops”
with the broader “political struggle for civil rights.” The old CIO organizers worked to unionize black laborers but, once again, demonstrated little commitment to the overall theme of race
advancement. This was telling, as Smolikoff and his band no longer
answered to cautious union bosses anxious over political flak and
potential white backlash. Instead, they belonged to an organization
whose avowed purpose was to sustain a massive, labor-oriented civil
36. Gerald Horne, Communist Front? 13-36; Lawrence S. Wittner, “The National
Negro Congress: A Reassessment,” American Quarterly 22 (Winter 1970), 883901; Charles H. Martin, “The International Labor Defense and Black America,”
Labor History 26 (Spring 1985), 165-94; Bella Fisher to Civil Rights Congress, July
26, 1948, Part 2, reel 24, CRC Papers; Mohl, “‘South of the South’?”
37. Bella Fisher to Len Goldsmith, December 16, 1948; William L. Patterson to
Bobby Graff, August 13, October 4, 1949; Bobby Graff to William L. Patterson,
August 17, December 12, 1949; Greater Miami Right to Work Committee, “An
Appeal to Reason,” mimeographed bulletin (1950?), all in Part 2, reel 24, CRC
Papers; Pittsburgh Courier, December 25, 1949; Mohl, “‘South of the South’?”
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rights movement. Yet, they balked at this mission, which led to disputes with some CRC Jews, like Graff, and black activists, like
Nimmo. National CRC leaders were equally displeased. In a letter
to Nimmo, the director of CRC branches recommended greater efforts to carry the movement to “Negro working people” and their
white working-class allies-something that Smolikoff’s CP-CIO coterie had clearly failed to do.38
CRC hopes for a joint labor-civil rights movement held no real
prospects for success, however, as the organization received a swift
deathblow from the political Right. On account of the group’s pronounced interracialism and commitment to civil equality, the CRC
was from its inception a constant target of harassment and repression by the KKK and the Miami police. Owing to its radical slant and
to the Communist tendencies of its pro-labor elements, the CRC
also fell victim to the right-wing political demagoguery of the early
cold war era. Conservative officeholders, reactionary civic clubs, and
a hyperpatriotic press all attacked the CRC as a Communist-front organization, putting the group on the defensive and undermining its
effectiveness. This “hysterical baiting,” as Bobby Graff called it, exacted a heavy toll, By mid-1950, Graff could report that right-wing
segregationist interests had driven her group into oblivion.39
The destruction of the CRC marked the end of the radical-led
drive for biracial unionism in Miami. AFL unions reclaimed their
hegemony, trampling the unionist aspirations of most African
Americans. During the McCarthy era, in fact, the city’s conservative
leadership accorded flag-waving AFL organizations carte blanche
to tighten racial controls. In the early 1950s, therefore, union officials were allowed to dictate the curricula of black vocational
schools in Dade County. Predictably, labor leaders compelled these
schools to offer training in traditional “colored” trades only, so that
black graduates could not compete in white-dominated fie1ds.40
Gross racial proscription in local building trades typified the
difficulties would-be black unionists faced in Miami during the
1950s. Throughout the first half of the decade, not a single construction-related union admitted black applicants, no matter how
38. Bobby Graff to William L. Patterson, March 31, August 17, 1949; Milton Wolff to
James Nimmo, March 3, 1950, Part 2, reel 24, CRC Papers.
39. Bobby Graff to Leon Josephson, March 4, 1949; Bobby Graff to William L.
Patterson, March 31, August 17, 1949, May 4, 1950, all in Part 2, reel 24, CRC
Papers; Miami Daily News, March 16, 1949; Mohl, “‘South of the South’?“;
Horne, Communist Front? 190-95, 252, 257.
40. Warren M. Banner, An Appraisal of Progress, 1943-1953 (New York, 1953), 63.
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highly qualified. This left black craftsmen, who were determined to
work as skilled mechanics in Miami despite color bars, with little recourse but to form their own unions. By the mid-1950s, therefore,
black plumbers, electricians, carpenters, painters, stonemasons,
roofers, hod carriers, and other building tradesmen had all formed
their own unions. Generally, these organizations served as segregated auxiliaries of the regular all-white unions.41
These Jim Crow unions had difficulty conducting business. Discriminatory hiring hall practices, for instance, limited the scope of
employment for African-American unionists. Invariably, white
union bosses enforced “gentlemen’s agreements” restricting black
operatives to job sites in “colored” districts while reserving all work
in white areas for whites, During the mid-1950s union managers violated these covenants whenever business in white areas tapered
off, however, “furloughing” black artisans so that out-of-work whites
could find employment in black neighborhoods. Under these circumstances, noted local NAACP counsel Howard W. Dixon in 1954,
black tradesmen received only “a modicum of work.“42
Black unionists encountered other roadblocks. Since Jim Crow
locals were not chartered by the AFL, they offered black workers
only second-class membership status. Workmen in “colored” auxiliaries paid union dues to the main local, but they seldom received
voting rights or other privileges that AFL labor contracts secured
for white union members. Furthermore, not one of Miami’s segregated unions allowed its black members to receive apprenticeship
training, effectively denying them access to the craft opportunities
and vocational instruction that prepared white operatives for career advancement.43

41. Howard W. Dixon to Herbert Hill, March 25, 1954, Part 13, Series A, reel 3,
NAACP Papers; Florida Council on Human Relations, “Negro Employment in
Miami,” New South 17 (May 1962), 8.
42. Howard W. Dixon to Herbert Hill, March 25, 1954, April 22, 1955, Part 13,
Series A, reel 3; Herbert Hill to Boris Shishkin, June 7, 1954, Part 13, Series A,
reel 11, NAACP Papers; Florida Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, Report on Florida: Constitutional Principle vs. Community Practice, A Survey of the Gap in Florida (Washington, D.C., 1963), 24-26, 40.
43. Greater Miami Right to Work Committee, “An Appeal to Reason,” Part 2, reel
24, CRC Papers; Howard W. Dixon to Herbert Hill April 15, 19, 1954; Herbert
Hill to Howard W. Dixon, May 28, 1954, all in Part 13, Series A, reel 3, NAACP
Papers; Florida Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
Report on Florida, 24-26.
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Black building tradesmen did not accept such discrimination
passively, however. Until around 1950, blacks actively backed the
CRC’s Greater Miami Right to Work Committee in its campaign to
end AFL restrictions that “denied [blacks] the right to earn a livelihood.” Once the CRC collapsed, though, black workers were left
without an organizational base through which to pursue their aims.
This organizational void persisted through the early 1950s. AfricanAmerican craftsmen could have turned to the local branch of the
NAACP during these years, but did not for good reason. Until the
mid-1950s Miami’s NAACP leadership proved meek, timid, and all
but dormant in its civil rights advocacy. As CRC chief Bobby Graff
reported in 1949, the Miami NAACP was “in very bad condition”
with an “‘Uncle Tom’leadership” that “want[ed] no participation
in any kind of struggle.“44
This situation changed in 1954, however, when a new NAACP
president, Father Theodore R. Gibson, infused his organization
with a more aggressive spirit. An Episcopal priest, Gibson emerged
as Miami’s preeminent black activist in the 1950s and 1960s. In
transforming the NAACP into a forceful voice for racial justice,
Gibson enjoyed the aid of another activist preacher, Reverend Edward T. Graham. Minister of the largest Baptist church in Miami,
Graham led several social protests in the 1940s as head of Miami’s
Negro Service Council, which served as the forerunner of the
Greater Miami Urban League. Not surprisingly, Gibson and Graham were the foremost leaders of the black freedom struggle in Miami during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, black voters
rewarded the two clergymen for their service by elevating them
both to the Miami City Commission.45 As soon as Miami’s NAACP
adopted a more activist stance, the city’s black construction tradesmen looked to the association as a new base from which to challenge discriminatory labor policies. In early 1954, Samuel W. Perry,
business manager of Miami’s all-black trowel-trades union, appealed to the NAACP to assist the workmen he represented in securing equal labor rights. The newly invigorated organization
enthusiatically accepted the invitation, launching a workmen’s
44. Greater Miami Right to Work Committee, “An Appeal to Reason;” Bobby Graff
to William L. Patterson, July 9, December 12, 1949, Part 2, reel 24, CRC Papers;
Mohl, “‘South of the South’?”
45. Raymond A. Mohl, “The Pattern of Race Relations in Miami since the 1920s,” in
David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers, eds., The African American Heritage of Florida (Gainesville, 1995), 326-65.
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rights campaign to “bust” the gentlemen’s agreements and to integrate the city’s lily-white craft unions. For several months, a team of
NAACP officers, including Graham and the group’s national labor
relations secretary, Herbert Hill, met with black union agents and
local AFL representatives to press the issue of integration. These
negotiations soon brought positive results. In autumn 1954, Sam
Perry’s trowel tradesmen successfully merged into the established
Bricklayers, Masons, and Plasterers Local 7 of Dade County.46
Yet, integrationist efforts failed in most other areas. Unions
representing carpenters, painters, tilesetters, sheetmetal workers,
and nearly all other building tradesmen held firmly to the color
bar, refusing to admit qualified black mechanics. In 1955, therefore, the NAACP could report that the AFL carpenters union had
not “lifted any color ban” but instead had “provoked more economic discrimination.” By the same token, union leaders continued to enforce covenants preventing black artisans from working
outside “colored” areas. And, not infrequently, union officials
maintained this arrangement by compelling contractors to refuse
jobs to black workmen. In 1955, for example, when one contractor
attempted to employ African-American carpenters on a “white”
project, he was informed by the AFL’s business agent that “he’d
better lay off if he didn’t want something to happen to his building.” Even the newly integrated bricklayers local adopted a policy
prohibiting the use of interracial work details.47
Miami’s NAACP chapter doubtless planned to escalate its
workmen’s rights campaign in order to emend these injustices, but
attacks by Florida McCarthyites soon precluded this possibility. Persecution of Miami’s leftist community by no means ended with the
dissolution of the CRC in 1950. As one writer for The Nation observed in 1955, a strain of “grass-roots McCarthyism” pervaded the
Miami area throughout the early 1950s. In 1954, for instance, both
46. Howard W. Dixon to Herbert Hill, March 25, June 2, August 21, 1954; Herbert
Hill to F. A. Rodriguez, December 3, 1954, all in Part 13, Series A, reel 3; Herbert Hill to Howard W. Dixon, June 8, 1954; NAACP, “Negro Mechanics Admitted to Ex-Lily-White Florida Union,” press release, September 2, 1954; NAACP,
“Dade County AFL Union Steps Up Integration,” October, 21, 1954, press
release, all in Part 13, Series A, reel 11; Herbert Hill to NAACP Executive Secretary, memorandum, September 7, 1954, Part 13, Series A, reel 20, NAACP
Papers.
47. Herbert Hill to Howard W. Dixon, September 15, 1954; Howard W. Dixon to
Herbert Hill, March 26, April 22, May 2, 1955, all in Part 13, Series A, reel 3,
NAACP Papers; Miami Herald, February 18, 1955.
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HUAC and a Dade County grand jury conducted hearings to ferret
out local Communists. A year later, the Florida Attorney General’s
office launched a similar crusade against subversive operations in
the state. During all these investigations, Miami labor radicals and
old CRC leftists, including Graff, Smolikoff, and Nimmo, endured
unrelenting harassment. County inquisitors even jailed Smolikoff
briefly after he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights during grand
jury proceedings.48
Against this backdrop, Miami’s NAACP branch pressed for
black inclusion in local labor unions. Though far more moderate
than the CIO or the CRC, the NAACP was nonetheless inviting
trouble. By the mid-1950s, Florida segregationists, like those
throughout the South, had come to see anticommunist rhetoric as
a potential means to forestall civil rights gains for blacks. According to guardians of white supremacy, any group that challenged the
established order was dangerously un-American. Hence, Miami’s
now-militant NAACP chapter was bound to encounter the same
right-wing molestation that debilitated local CRC and CIO affiliates
in the 1940s.
Indeed, in 1956 state lawmakers created a body to carry out
this mission— the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee
(FLIC), which was headed by former Klansman and staunch white
supremacist Charley Johns.49 Ostensibly, the Johns Committee was
intended to keep subversive state groups in check. In reality, the
FLIC functioned as a conservative weapon to stifle civil rights activism in Florida by attempting to expose the state NAACP as a Communist-front organization, and the committee made Miami’s
NAACP branch its primary target. In 1957, FLIC witch-hunters began a six-year crusade in Miami to “show a definite tie-up between
the Communist movement and the NAACP” in Florida. Year after
year, the FLIC subjected Miami NAACP members to batteries of
hearings and high-pressure interrogations, hoping, as the leader of
48. Frank Dormer, “The Miami Formula: An Exposé of Grass-Roots McCarthyism,”
The Nation 180 (January 22, 1955), 65-71; Leslie B. Bain, “Red Hunt in Miami:
Who Formed the Posse?” The Nation 179 (August 7, 1954), 110-12; Mohl,
“‘South of the South’?“; “Testimony of James Nimmo,” in HUAC, Investigation of
Communist Activities in the State of Florida, 7426-48; “Testimony of James Nimmo”;
“Testimony of Charles Smolikoff,” box 6, FLIC Papers; Rubin, Report on Investigation of Subversive Activities in Florida, 38-52; Miami Herald, September 1, 1954;
Daily Worker, September 16, December 23, 30, 31,1954.
49. David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan, 3rd ed.
(Durham, N.C., 1987), 340.
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Miami’s CORE affiliate noted, “to smoke out reds in the NAACP.“50
By 1959, both Gibson and Graham found themselves on trial for
contempt, with Gibson’s case reaching the U.S. Supreme Court. A
1963 directive by the Court finally ended FLIC harassment of the
Miami NAACP.51
Unlike some embattled NAACP groups elsewhere, Miami’s
NAACP branch never ceased functioning during its red-baiting ordeal. The costs of combating McCarthyite witch-hunts nonetheless
placed a “heavy financial burden” on the Miami NAACP, while the
whole affair precipitated a temporary drop in membership for the
organization.52 These developments forced Father Gibson and his
associates to reduce the scope of their activities. From the late
1950s through the early 1960s, the Miami NAACP concentrated almost exclusively upon matters of school integration, black voter
registration, and integration of public accommodations.53 Hence,

50. Theodore R. Gibson to Miami NAACP members, March 3, 1958, Series 1, box 3,
Robert W. Saunders Papers, University of South Florida Library, Tampa (hereinafter Saunders Papers); Shirley Zoloth to Gordon Carey and James Robinson,
(November 1959?), Series 5, reel 19, CORE Papers.
51. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Graham v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 126 Southern Reporter, 2d Series 133
(1960); Robert W. Saunders to Roy Wilkins, memorandum, June 22, 1959; Robert W. Saunders to Rutledge Pearson, (1963?), both in Series 1, box 1, Saunders
Papers; Miami Herald, February 5-26, 1957, February 8-28, March 1, 1958, March
27, 1963; Miami News, February 7, June 18, 1958, March 27-28, 1963; Miami
Times, March 8, 1958, April 11, 1959. See also Steven F. Lawson, “The Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee and the Constitutional Readjustment of
Race Relations, 1956-1963,” in Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely, Jr., eds., An
Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South (Athens, 1989),
296-325.
52. Theodore R. Gibson to Miami NAACP members, March 3, 1958; Helen M. Berckmann to Robert W. Saunders, March 10, 1958, Series 1, box 3, Saunders
Papers; Lawson, “The Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,” 316.
53. For the Miami NAACP and school integration, see Southern School News, July
1956, 2, September 1958, 9; Miami Herald, August 19, September 14, 18, 1958;
NAACP, Miami Branch, “An Open Letter to All Negro Parents of School-Age
Children in Dade County,” mimeographed typescript, (1957?), Series 1, box 3,
Saunders Papers; Florida Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Report on Florida, 14; Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County,
Florida, 272 Federal Reporter, 2d Series 763 (1959). For the Miami NAACP and
black voter registration, see Robert W. Saunders to Theodore R. Gibson, March
27, 1959; Robert W. Saunders to John M. Brooks, December 18, 1959, both in
Series 1, box 1, Saunders Papers. For the Miami NAACP and the fight to integrate public facilities, see Edward T. Graham to Theodore R. Gibson, August 8,
1960, LeRoy Collins Papers, Record Group 102, Series 776, box 33, Florida
State Archives, Tallahassee; Miami News, June 7, 1956, April 11, 1960; Miami Herald, March 5, April 12, 1960; Miami Times, June 16, November 17, 1956, August
17, 1957, July 23, August 6, 20, September 3, 1960.
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the group essentially discontinued its workmen’s rights campaign
during this span. Understandably, then, Miami’s African-American
workers made little headway in organized labor at this time.
In the late 1950s a handful of Miami unions did voluntarily desegregate. With the exception of the hotel employees union, these
groups embraced few African-American workers. Even the hotel
workers union refused to refer blacks to jobs unless employers specifically requested black workers.54 The overall picture was even
more bleak. In 1963, Robert W. Saunders, field secretary for the
NAACP’s Florida State Conference, remarked: “As labor goes, so
goes the Negro.“55 Unfortunately, labor did not “go” at all well for
African Americans in these years. At the end of the 1950s for example, a county-wide human rights audit sponsored by more than
a dozen Greater Miami civic groups found that “unions composed
of highly skilled workmen with apprenticeship systems exclude[d]
Negroes” as a matter of official policy. As of 1962 and 1963, in fact,
not one of the 1,500 people engaged in apprenticeship training
programs in Dade County was black. By 1968, the number of black
apprentices in Miami had climbed to only four.56
In the early 1960s several state agencies documented the extent of racial bias in Miami unions. A 1962 study by the Florida
Council on Human Relations found that Miami locals exhibited “a
generally negative attitude” toward the idea of biracial unionism.
Most unions barred blacks from membership or “adhere[d] to
strict segregation.“57 The Florida Advisory Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights made similar observations in 1963.
The committee detected blatant patterns of color-based exclusion
in many locals, while reporting that gentlemen’s agreements remained pervasive in building-trades unions. Further, during interviews with the committee, many union officials made no pretense
of masking their racial prejudice. When committeemen inquired
into the absence of African-American electricians in Miami, the di54. American Civil Liberties Union of Greater Miami et al., “Tenth Anniversary Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Community Audit of Human Rights in
Greater Miami, pamphlet, December 10, 1958, box 8, GACRR Records; Florida
Council on Human Relations, “Negro Employment in Miami,” 8.
55. “The Negro in Florida,” Florida Trend 5 (February 1963), 19.
56. “Tenth Anniversary Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” box 8, GACRR
Records; Florida Council on Human Relations, “Negro Employment in Miami,”
6-7; Florida Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report
on Florida, 23; Philip Meyer et al., Miami Negroes: A Study in Depth (Miami, 1968),
50.
57. Florida Council on Human Relations, “Negro Employment in Miami,” 8.
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rector of the electricians apprenticeship program responded that
blacks simply “lack[ed] the technical understanding of electricity”
and were “not interested in hazardous work.” A plumbers union
spokesman, meanwhile, indicated that black apprentices were not
welcome in his field due to the “close physical association required
for instruction.“58
By the early 1960s then, black Miamians were scarcely better
off with respect to their position in organized labor than they had
been two decades earlier. As the Miami NAACP noted in 1963,
“union bias” and other discriminatory “conditions . . . in the ranks
of labor” persisted with considerable vigor.59 Change was coming,
however, but not until the civil rights movement reached its peak in
the mid-1960s. Only then did the pressure of black activism, federal
civil rights legislation, and affirmative action measures combine to
create opportunities for African-American advancement within organized labor.
Ironically, the movement that finally succeeded in opening
union doors for Miami blacks placed little emphasis upon labor issues, In fact, the civil rights movement of the 1960s had few connections at all with earlier labor-related activism. This observation
runs counter to recent arguments made by scholars who see definite links between the radical, labor-associated social reformism of
the 1930s and 1940s and the later civil rights crusade. In studying
Communist activists in Depression-era Alabama, for example,
Robin D. G. Kelley concludes that CP radicals “indirectly contributed to the 1960s revolution.” Though recognizing the civil rights
campaign as a “new movement,” he insists that it was nonetheless
rooted in the radicalism of the past.60
Kelley probably overstates the case. In most southern communities, the links between the two movements were less certain. Even
Korstad and Lichtenstein, who depict the Communist-connected
CIO in Winston-Salem as an effective bastion of true racial progressivism, do not detect a residual radical impact upon North Carolina’s civil rights movement. The earlier union-centered activism,
they contend, was “a very different sort of civil rights movement”
58. Florida Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report on
Florida, 23-25.
59. NAACP, Miami Branch, News Letter 1 (May 1963), p. 2, in Series 1, box 3, Saunders Papers.
60. Robin D. G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill, 1990), 228-31.
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than the one that followed it. Indeed, the “voices of black protest”
that sustained the labor-based movement of the 1940s “played little
role in the new mobilization” of the 1960s.61
The same was true in Miami. The CIO and CRC campaigns of
the 1940s bore little relation to the church-based protests of subsequent decades. The black church, together with independent raceadvancement groups such as the NAACP and CORE, supplanted
labor unions completely as the institutional base of the black freedom struggle. Activist ministers, like Theodore Gibson and Edward
T. Graham, emerged as the new leaders in the fight for racial justice. Joining the black clergy were middle-class professionals such
as Albert D. Moore, an insurance agent who chaired Miami’s
CORE group, and Dr. John O. Brown, a physician who held leadership positions in both CORE and the NAACP. None of these figures had ties to radical labor causes.
By the same token, the prominent CIO organizers and CRC
leftists of the 1940s had no connection with Miami’s civil rights
movement. For instance, Charlie Smolikoff, James Nimmo, and
Bobby Graff all left Miami in the mid-1950s run out of town by McCarthyite witch-hunters. Smolikoff and Graff even fled the country
briefly, seeking refuge in Mexico and Canada respectively.62 They
left no legacy to the next generation of social activists. Indeed, participants in Miami’s civil rights struggle purposefully eschewed the
radicalism that Smolikoff, Graff, and Nimmo embraced. This contributed in no small measure to the success of Miami’s civil rights
movement. Red-tainted groups like the CIO and CRC made easy
targets for McCarthyite segregationists. Attacking the black church
and its allies, however, was akin to assaulting respectable, even
mainstream, American values: Christian ethics, simple justice, nonviolent protest. Jim Crow’s cause stood no chance against these
odds. This conceptualization goes far in explaining why a black
freedom movement not specifically concerned with labor matters
could strike down Jim Crow unionism, while earlier labor-affiliated
reformers failed to establish a genuine movement, or even to curtail the scope of labor discrimination.

61. Korstad and Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Found and Lost,” 800, 805, 811
62. Mohl, “‘South of the South’?”
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